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Article 4

The Pro Se Phenomenon
Drew A. Swank, Esq.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Why would anyone choose to go to court without a lawyer? It is a
simple question. In the varied host of television dramas, attorneys, not
the parties, are always arguing the cases. Only on reality/entertainment
oriented shows like “Judge Judy” and the like do people argue their own
cases. Such pro se appearances typically result in the parties being
mocked, berated, and the law ignored.1 These examples hardly show any
positive aspects of going to court without counsel. Attorneys’ own
lexicon even encourages against proceeding pro se with the adage that
“one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client.”2
The answer to the simple question of why people proceed pro se,
however, is not quite so straightforward. While there is a great deal of
anecdotal evidence as to why people represent themselves in court, there
has been relatively little substantive research into the issue.3 While it
may not be understood why people go to court without counsel, it is
certainly perceived by many commentators that more are doing so now
than ever before.4 Another perception is that people litigating their own
*
Drew Swank is a graduate of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of William and
Mary. Having served in a variety of public service positions, Mr. Swank has litigated over 8,200
federal and state, criminal and civil cases, often in cases with pro se litigants.
1. See, e.g., Associated Press, A Talent Scout for TV Courtroom?, THE MORNING SUN
ONLINE (Feb. 28, 1999), available at http://www.morningsun.net/stories/022899/usw_
0228990015.shtml.
2. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Edward
M. Holt, How to Treat “Fools”: Exploring the Duties Owed to Pro Se Litigants in Civil Cases, 25 J.
LEGAL PROF. 167, 173 (2001).
3. Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness in
Pro Se Cases: a Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 305, 310 (2002) (stating that there has been only one study that has examined federal pro se case
data).
4. See, e.g., Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to
Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 597 (1993); Lois Bloom &
Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 479 (2002); Ronald W. Staudt & Paula L. Hannaford, Technology and
Legal Practice Symposium Issue: Access to Justice for the Self-Represented Litigant: An
Interdisciplinary Investigation By Designers And Lawyers, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1017, 1018 (2002);
John M. Stanoch, Working With Pro Se Litigants: The Minnesota Experience, 24 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 297 (1998); Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting
the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36 (2002); Jona Goldschmidt, Access
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cases are a problem—a problem for both themselves and our courts.5
This Note examines the rise of pro se litigation in recent years, which can
be called the pro se phenomenon, and offers some alternatives to these
common misperceptions regarding pro se litigants. By examining the
ability to proceed pro se, the frequency of pro se litigation, the reasons
why pro se litigants exist, and the legal implications for pro se litigants
and the rest of society, this Note suggests that the reason for pro se
litigation is not as black and white as it is imagined to be. As courts
around the United States contemplate creating procedures to better assist
or accommodate pro se litigants, it is imperative that the reason for pro se
litigation be understood. Without an accurate understanding of the
current pro se environment, changes to the system might be made for the
wrong reasons or end up being ineffective.
II. THE ABILITY TO PROCEED PRO SE
The right to represent oneself in United States courts dates back to
the founding of the country.6 Having its roots in the British common
law,7 the right to pro se appearances evolved as a combined proposition
of “natural law,” an early anti-lawyer sentiment,8 and the egalitarian “all
men are created equal” concept that “financial status should not have a
substantial impact on the outcome of litigation.”9 The American legal
to Justice Conference September 11, 2001: In Defense Of Ghostwriting, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1145 (2002); Michael J. Mueller, (The Thirty-Second Thomas M. Cooley Lectures Constitutional
Protection of Human Rights: Perspectives from Abroad: Note:) Abusive Pro Se Plaintiffs in the
Federal Courts: Proposals for Judicial Control, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 93, 101 (1984); Amy C.
Henderson, Meaningful Access to the Courts?: Assessing Self-Represented Litigants’ Ability to
Obtain a Fair, Inexpensive Divorce in Missouri’s Court System, 72 UMKC L. REV. 571, 574 (2003);
Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response to the
Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 107 (2001);
Russell Engler, And Justice For All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the
Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2022 (1999); Mike Jay Garcia, Key
Trends in the Legal Profession, 71 FLA. BAR J. 16, 20 (1997); Tiffany Buxton, Foreign Solutions to
the U.S. Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 103 (2002).
5. Rosenbloom, supra note 3, at 312-14 (stating that the negative perception of pro se
litigants has not been objectively studied or documented, but is rather based on anecdotal evidence);
Connie J. A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Divorce Mediation Research and
Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y AND L. 989, 993 (2000); Berenson, supra note 4, at 112; Buxton,
supra note 4, at 114-15.
6. Jona Goldschmidt, Cases and Materials on Pro Se Litigation and Related Issues, remarks
prepared for the ABA Lawyers’ Conference Annual Meeting, Tucson, Arizona, May 1-4, 1997,
available at http://www.pro-selaw.org/pro-selaw/research.asp (last visited June 5, 2004) (citations
omitted); Holt, supra note 2, at 168.
7. Buxton, supra note 4, at 107; Eric J.R. Nichols, Preserving Pro Se Representation in an
Age of Rule 11 Sanctions, 67 TEX. L. REV. 351, 379-80 (1988) (citations omitted).
8. Goldschmidt, supra note 6.
9. Tiffany Buxton, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 103, 109 (2002).
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ideal is that both the wealthy and the pauper could have access to the
courts and could be treated equally with the resulting decisions being as
fair as possible.10 The development of pro se rights in the United States
has been tied to the rights of indigents to have access to the courts.11
Open access to the courts for all citizens has also been viewed as being
important for the development of law and public policy and the
avoidance of citizens’ resorting to non-judicial self-help.12
The Judiciary Act of 1789 was an early codification of this belief.13
It granted “parties the right to ‘plead and conduct their own case
personally’ in any court of the United States.”14 Many states, either
through their constitutions or statutorily, also provide individuals with
the right to proceed pro se.15 It is unclear, however, if there is a right to
self-representation pursuant to the United States Constitution.16 The
Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to have
assistance of counsel; by implication, the Amendment has served as a
basis to hold that criminal defendants can waive that right and appear pro
se.17 Additionally, the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments have
served as support for the right of individuals to have access to the courts
without being represented.18 Whatever right there is to proceed pro se,
however, it has not been extended by the Supreme Court to civil cases.19
While federal and state courtroom procedures20 have been modified to
accommodate the right to proceed pro se in criminal cases, there have

10. Id. at 111.
11. Id. at 103.
12. Eric J.R. Nichols, Preserving Pro Se Representation in an Age of Rule 11 Sanctions, 67
TEX. L. REV. 351, 379-80 (1988) (citations omitted).
13. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
14. See generally Buxton, supra note 9, at 109-10; Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due
Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 660-61 (1988); Holt, supra note 2,
at 168. This privilege continues today as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2004).
15. Bradlow, supra note 14; Candice K. Lee, Access Denied: Limitations on Pro Se
Litigants’ Access to the Courts in the Eighth Circuit, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261, 1265-66 (2003).
16. See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Note: An Extension of the Right of Access: The Pro Se
Litigant’s Right to Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment Rule, 55 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1109 (1987); Lee, supra note 15, at 1265.
17. Bradlow, supra note 14; Goldschmidt, supra note 6; Holt, supra note 2, at 168; see
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975).
18. Nichols, supra note 12.
19. Nichols, supra note 12 at 379 (citations omitted); Lee, supra note 15, at 1280-81
(citations omitted) (stating indigents do not have a right to counsel for civil matters); Deborah L.
Rhode, Equal Justice Under Law: Connecting Principle to Practice, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47,
49-50 (2003).
20. Pro se pleadings are to be read liberally, and in some jurisdictions, pro se litigants must
be advised by the court or the opposing party of the ramifications of failing to respond to a summary
judgment motion. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 876 (7th Cir. 1981);
McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 1122.
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been few changes to accommodate pro se litigants in civil cases even
though the number of civil pro se cases has risen considerably.21
III. THE FREQUENCY OF PRO SE LITIGATION
Having pro se litigants in many United States courts is a reality. In
“poor people courts”—the state courts that handle traffic,
landlord/tenant, and child support or other domestic relations issues—the
number of cases in which at least one side is pro se far outnumbers those
in which counsel represents both parties.22 The number of unrepresented
litigants in these types of cases has surged nationwide, especially in
family law cases.23 Some reports indicate that eighty to ninety percent or
more of family law cases involve at least one pro se litigant.24 While in
many cases both sides will be unrepresented, in perhaps one-third or
more of all litigation, a pro se litigant opposes a represented party.25
Even more spectacular than the number of pro se litigants is the growth
rate of pro se litigation. For instance, in 1971, only one percent of
litigants in divorce cases in California were pro se.26 By 1985, the rate
had risen to forty-seven percent and currently, the rate is approaching
seventy-five percent.27 Regardless of the exact percentages, pro se
litigation rates have been growing at an exponential rate and many
commentators believe they are much higher now than ever before in
United States history.28
21. Buxton, supra note 4.
22. Engler, supra note 4, at 1987.
23. Berenson, supra note 4, at 105.
24. Engler, supra note 4, at 2047; Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se
Clinics a Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law School
Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1884 (1999) (reporting the results of an Arizona
study that found approximately ninety percent of divorce cases involved at least one pro se litigant
and in fifty-two percent of divorce cases both parties were pro se); Bonnie Rose Hough, Description
of California Court’s Programs for Self-Represented Litigants, prepared for the meeting of the
International Legal Aid Group, Harvard University (2003), at http://www.unbundlelaw.org/Program
%20Profiles/California%20SRL%20Projects.pdf.
25. Engler, supra note 4, at 2048.
26. Hough, supra note 24; Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice:
Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, supra note 4.
27. Frances L. Harrison et al., Courts Responding to Communities: California’s Family Law
Facilitator Program: A New Paradigm for the Courts, 2 J. CENTER CHILD. & CTS. 61 (2000)
(citations omitted).
28. Hough, supra note 24; Engler, supra note 4; Paul D. Healey, In Search of the Delicate
Balance: Legal and Ethical Questions in Assisting the Pro Se Patron, 90 LAW LIBR. J. 129, 132
(1998); Lee, supra note 15, at 1280 (citations omitted) (referring to the increase as a “floodtide”);
John M. Greacen, Self Represented Litigants and Court and Legal Services Responses to Their
Needs: What We Know 1 (July 20, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (referring to
the increase as an “explosion”). But see id. (manuscript at 4) (citing data that suggests that the
numbers of pro se litigants are not increasing, but rather remaining constant in those cases in which
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State courts are not alone in having more pro se litigants; federal
courts have seen an increase in pro se litigants as well, particularly in the
areas of civil rights claims involving employment discrimination and fair
housing issues.29 One study of federal litigation found that pro se
litigants appeared in thirty-seven percent of all cases, with the number of
pro se litigants in federal appeals courts having increased by forty-nine
percent in a two-year period.30 Each term, approximately 2,000 civil
litigants file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of
the United States, with only five percent actually being heard and
decided by the Court.31 Rarely is a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari
granted—one study found that only one-third of one percent of pro se
petitions are heard and decided by the Court.32 Some argue that this
represents bias by the Supreme Court against pro se litigants and
therefore against the poor; others respond that it demonstrates merely
that most of the issues being raised by pro se litigants do not meet the
review criteria of the Court.33
Unfortunately, as more and more parties are representing themselves
in court, the need for legal counsel in litigation has also increased.34 In
the last sixty years, legal services “have become more of a necessity and
less of a luxury when compared to the past.”35 For example, family law
cases have not only grown in number but also in complexity.36 Child
support litigation, a rarity just thirty years ago, now affects one out of
four children in the United States and involves close to one-hundred
billion dollars owed in unpaid support being pursued by state child
support enforcement agencies employing dedicated attorneys and support
staff.37

pro se litigants are common—domestic relations, domestic violence, child support, traffic, and
landlord/tenant).
29. Buxton, supra note 4, at 105; Holt, supra note 2, at 167.
30. Buxton, supra note 4, at 112 (citations omitted).
31. Kevin H. Smith, Justice for All?: The Supreme Court’s Denial of Pro Se Petitions for
Certiorari, 63 ALB. L. REV. 381, 382 (1999).
32. Id. at 384.
33. See id. at 381 (analyzing why the Supreme Court accepts or declines cases).
34. Buxton, supra note 4, at 111; see also Raul v. Esquivel, III, The Ability of the Indigent to
Access the Legal Process in Family Law Matters, 1 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 79, 80 (2000) (noting that
the increase in domestic relations cases is out of proportion to the increase in the population).
35. Buxton, supra note 4, at 111.
36. Compare Berenson, supra note 4, at 105 (discussing the growth of family law litigation)
with Report of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Gender Bias Study of the Court System in
Massachusetts, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745, 764 (1990) (discussing the increase in complexity of
family law cases).
37. See generally Drew A. Swank, The National Child Non-Support Epidemic, 2003 MICH.
ST. DCL L. REV. 357 (2003).
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IV. WHY PRO SE LITIGATION EXISTS
Popular opinion holds that the reason for the increase in pro se
appearances is the high cost of attorneys and litigation.38 Furthermore,
the common belief is that all “[p]ro se civil litigants want counsel to
represent them . . .,”39 and that no person would choose to be pro se.40
The inability of a large portion of American society to afford “attorney
assistance has been deemed one of the glaring failures of our system,
straining the principle of equal justice under the law.”41 The perceived
result is that pro se litigants are reluctant participants in the legal
system.42
These popular opinions, however, are misguided. In one survey,
forty-five percent of pro se litigants stated that they chose to represent
themselves because their case was simple—often involving a single,
clear cut issue—and not because they could not afford an attorney.43
Only thirty-one percent stated they were pro se because they could not
afford to retain counsel.44 Almost half implied that they had the
necessary funds to hire an attorney, but chose not to.45
There are many reasons for the growth of pro se litigation other than
the cost of securing legal assistance. Some of the reasons cited in various
surveys include:
(1) increased literacy rates,46
(2) increased sense of consumerism,47

38. Barry, supra note 24 (citations omitted); Bradlow, supra note 14, at 669-70 (citations
omitted); Buxton, supra note 4, at 111; Esquivel, supra note 34, at 85 (stating that the cost of
litigation prevents many matters that need to be litigated from coming to court); Goldschmidt, The
Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar
Resistance, supra note 4; Harrison, supra note 27; Healey, supra note 28, at 133 (stating most
commentators would agree that the majority of individuals are pro se due to an inability to afford
counsel); Lee, supra note 15, at 1280-81; McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 1132-33.
39. Candice K. Lee, Access Denied: Limitations on Pro Se Litigants’ Access to the Courts in
the Eighth Circuit, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261, 1265 (2003).
40. Id.
41. McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 1132-33.
42. See generally Holt, supra note 2.
43. Goldschmidt, supra note 6 (citations omitted); see also Greacen, supra note 28, at 3.
44. Jona Goldschmidt, Cases and Materials on Pro Se Litigation and Related Issues, remarks
prepared for the ABA Lawyers’ Conference Annual Meeting, Tucson, Arizona, May 1-4, 1997,
available at http://www.pro-selaw.org/pro-selaw/research.asp (last visited June 5, 2004).
45. Id. But see Engler, supra note 4, at 2027 (stating that while some litigants who could
afford counsel refrain from doing so, the notion that most litigants choose to forego legal
representation is fictitious in many contexts).
46. Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the
Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, supra note 4.
47. Id.
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(3) increased sense of individualism and belief in one’s own
abilities,48
(4) an anti-lawyer sentiment,49
(5) a mistrust of the legal system,50
(6) a belief that the public defender in criminal cases is
overburdened,51
(7) a belief that the court will do what is right whether the party is
represented or not,52
(8) a belief that litigation has been simplified to the point that
attorneys are not needed,53 and
(9) a trial strategy designed to gain either sympathy54 or a procedural
advantage over represented parties.55
Still another reason why individuals appear pro se is that they are
advised to proceed on their own. According to one survey in Idaho,
thirty-one percent of pro se litigants consulted counsel before trial and
were advised that they did not need an attorney either because their case
was uncontested or simple enough to handle on their own.56 Some pro se
litigants, based upon repeated experiences with the legal system, may
actually be better able to represent themselves in court than would
counsel.57 In some rural locations, even if a litigant wishes to hire an
attorney, there may be none to be found.58 Likewise, there are some areas
of law in which few attorneys’ practice, such as landlord/tenant disputes
and in certain areas of family law, thereby resulting in the necessity of
pro se appearances.59 Absent dictating to attorneys where they can live
48. Id.; Healey, supra note 28 (citations omitted).
49. Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the
Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, supra note 4; Bradlow, supra note 14, at 661-62; Greacen,
supra note 28, at 3 (citations omitted); Healey, supra note 28 (citations omitted).
50. Nichols, supra note 12, at 380; Healey, supra note 28.
51. Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 659, 661-62 (1988).
52. Id.; Healey, supra note 28, at 133 (citations omitted).
53. Healey, supra note 28 (citations omitted).
54. Bradlow, supra note 51.
55. Healey, supra note 28, at 133 (citations omitted).
56. Frances H. Thompson, Access to Justice in Idaho, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1313, 1316
(2002).
57. Healey, supra note 28, at 133 (citations omitted). Some pro se litigants, through dealing
with the same issue for years, not only gain a mastery of the facts relevant to the case but also
“develop an advanced and sophisticated knowledge of litigation and the law” regarding their case.
Report of the Working Committees to the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic
Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 124, 308-09 (1997).
58. Thompson, supra note 56, at 1315; Harrison, supra note 27; Hough, supra note 24.
59. Thompson, supra note 56, at 1315; Engler, supra note 4, at 2016 (citing the shortage of
available lawyers for the poor).
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and what type of law they will practice, this situation is unlikely to
change anytime soon.
Although Judge Posner’s position in Merritt v. Faulkner was
severely criticized both in the opinion and subsequently, it has some truth
to it. For certain types of cases in which there is potential for a large
judgment—such as personal injury or medical malpractice—and a high
probability of success, the market will more often than not provide
attorneys to represent those plaintiffs.60 However, where little or no
profit motive exists—where the potential client is a plaintiff in an
unprofitable case, a defendant, or where only injunctive or declaratory
relief is sought—the market is highly unlikely to provide the necessary
representation.61
Another reason for the lack of supply to meet the demand is the
failure of low- or no-cost legal assistance mechanisms to provide legal
assistance to those who need it. Legal assistance traditionally comes
from three sources: the government or private sector in the form of legal
services programs, the courts in the form of court-appointed counsel, or
the bar.62 All of these programs, offering traditional, full-service legal
representation at no- or very low-cost to the litigant, have fallen short of
meeting demand.63 Both governmentally and privately funded legal
services programs lack resources to help many civil litigants even though
they are eligible for assistance.64 Only a small fraction gets assistance,
and the assistance the litigants receive is minimal—usually only brief
advice and not the needed full-service legal representation.65
Prior to the 1960s, there was little government assistance for
representation in civil litigation66 and recently, this lack of assistance has

60. Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1983); Merritt v. Faulkner, 823 F.2d 1150 (7th
Cir. 1987). For a critique of Judge Posner’s argument, see Robin Paul Malloy, Framing the Market:
Representations of Meaning and Value in Law, Markets, and Culture, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2003).
61. Lee, supra note 15, at 1280-81; Bradlow, supra note 14 (citations omitted).
62. Government and private sector programs can range from efforts by law schools to official
legal aid programs. See generally Margaret Martin Barry, Access to Justice Conference September
11, 2001: Access to Justice: On Dialogues with the Judiciary, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089 (2002);
Barry, supra note 24, at 1888; Helen B. Kim, Legal Education for the Pro Se Litigant: A Step
Towards a Meaningful Right to Be Heard, 96 YALE L.J. 1641, 1643 (1987). Efforts by the bar can
range from free clinics ran by attorneys for pro se litigants to pro bono representation. See generally
Access to Justice: Does it Exist in Civil Cases?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 455 (2004).
63. Harrison, supra note 27.
64. Nichols, supra note 12, at 384 (citations omitted).
65. Rhode, supra note 19, at 54.
66. Buxton, supra note 4, at 105-106; Caroline Durham, Law Schools Making a Difference:
An Examination of Public Service Requirements, 13 LAW & INEQ. 39, 40 (1994) (noting the
importance of legal clinics and that the demand for their services outstrips the supply); see also
Barry, supra note 24. Ms. Barry writes that the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 instituted the
first federally supported legal services program for the poor. Prior to 1964, there were about 150
legal aid societies in the United States employing 600 lawyers with a combined budget of $4 million;
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gotten worse. Over the last two decades, federal funding for legal
services programs has been cut by one-third while greater restrictions
have been placed on the type of cases and the type of clients that
government-funded programs can help.67 The lack of funding has
resulted in four-fifths of the legal needs of the poor and two- to threefifths of the legal needs of the middle class being unmet.68 The net result
is that there is only one lawyer available to serve approximately 9,000
low-income persons,69 and in the mid-1990s, approximately 9.1 million
Americans’ legal needs went unmet.70 It has been estimated that it would
take three to four billion dollars a year to merely meet the minimal civil
legal needs of low-income Americans—ten-times the $300 million now
being spent.71
Other means of providing legal services to the poor have likewise
failed. Except in very limited circumstances, courts routinely decline to
provide court-appointed counsel in civil cases.72 While courts can
appoint counsel for a variety of reasons, they often do not.73 With state
budgets in crisis, the states and courts have little incentive to use
available funds to provide counsel in civil cases.74 Surveys indicate that
the vast majority of the public favors legal representation for the poor,
but only if it does not result in increased cost to the taxpaying public.75
The majority of respondents prefer legal assistance from volunteer
attorneys and not government subsidies, and forty percent want the
government to provide advice only, not representation in litigation.76 It is
within a few years of the Act’s passage, that number grew to over 2500 lawyers with a budget in
excess of $60 million. Barry, supra note 24.
67. Buxton, supra note 4, at 105-06; Rhode, supra note 19, at 50.
68. Engler, supra note 4; Rhode, supra note 19.
69. Rhode, supra note 19.
70. Barry, supra note 24, at 1885.
71. Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice Under Law: Connecting Principle to Practice, 12
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 50 (2003).
72. Id. at 55.
73. Id., at 49-50; Nichols, supra note 12, at 384 (citations omitted).
74. See Jeffrey Cohan, Alleghany County’s legal defense fund runs dry, POST-GAZETTE.COM,
Aug. 20, 2002, at http://www.post-gazette.com/localnews/20020820defense 0820p2.asp; see also
Eric Bartels, Protest Arrests May Clog Courts, PORTLAND TRIBUNE, Mar. 28, 2003, available at
http://www.portlandtribune.com/archview.cgi?id=17336 (stating that the state budget crisis has
resulted in elimination of court days and delayed trials for months); see generally David M.
Herszenhorn, How Did Such a Rich State Get So Poor?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2002, available at
http://www.ccsu.edu/aaup/csu/herszenhornarticle.htm; Jeffrey L. Rabin, State Spent Its Way Into
Budget Crisis, L.A. TIMES.COM, Oct. 29, 2002, at www.caltax.org/LATimesStateSpentWayIntoBudgetCrisis10-29-02.pdf; Robert Sandler, State Lawmakers are Calling This the
Worst
Budget
in
Years,
MISSOURI
DIGITAL
NEWS,
Mar.
1,
2002,
at
http://www.mdn.org/2002/Stories/Budget3.htm.
75. Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice Under Law: Connecting Principle to Practice, 12
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 53 (2003).
76. Id.
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important to note that “[a]lmost four-fifths of Americans incorrectly
believe that the poor are now entitled to legal aid in civil cases, and only
a third think that they would have a very difficult time obtaining
assistance.”77
The private bar has also failed in providing assistance to those who
cannot afford legal representation.78 “State supreme courts have adopted
only aspirational standards, coupled in a few jurisdictions with
occasional court assignments or mandatory reporting systems. Yet, most
lawyers have failed to meet these aspirational goals and the performance
of the profession as a whole remains at a shameful level.”79 As one
commentator noted:
[R]ecent surveys indicate that most lawyers provide no significant pro
bono assistance to the poor. In most states, fewer than a fifth of lawyers
offer such services. The average pro bono contribution is under half an
hour a week and half a dollar a day . . . Fewer than a fifth of the
nation’s 100 most financially successful firms meet the ABA’s standard
of providing fifty hours a year of pro bono service. Over the past
decade, when these firms’ revenues grew by over fifty percent, their
average pro bono hours decreased by a third. For many other
employers, salary wars have pushed compensation levels to a new
height that has eroded, rather than expanded, support for pro bono
programs.80

The small amount of pro bono work currently being provided has done
little to relieve the need for legal services.81
Despite the various mechanisms to provide legal assistance to the
poor, according to a report of the American Bar Association, seventy to
eighty percent or more of low-income persons are unable to obtain legal
assistance when they need and want it.82 Legal aid societies lack the
funding to provide more services to more individuals.83 Courts lack the
funds to appoint counsel to represent litigants except in mandatory or
unusual cases.84 Private attorneys lose money by providing pro bono

77. Id.
78. Id. at 59.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 59-60 (citations omitted).
81. Barry, supra note 24, at 1884-85.
82. Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2241 (1999) (citations omitted); see also Barry, supra note 24, at 1883-84.
83. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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services.85 While the lack of money at a variety of levels may be the
cause of the problem, the results for litigants are far reaching. The lack of
a cohesive means for low- and middle-income individuals to have legal
representation results in them failing to resolve their legal issues,
abandoning their rights, or attempting to do it on their own. Pro se
litigants normally have no access to any sort of professional legal
advice.86
Access to legal counsel is just one aspect of the problem. According
to another American Bar Association survey, the legal issues of less than
thirty percent of low-income households and forty percent of moderateincome households are brought to the justice system, whether or not legal
counsel is involved.87 While these individuals could bring their problems
to court themselves, there are multiple reasons why they do not. These
include:
(1) the belief that legal intervention would not help,
(2) concerns about the cost even without attorneys,
(3) the belief that the problem was not serious or “legal” enough to
take to court,
(4) the desire to avoid confrontation, and
(5) the desire to handle the problem on their own.88
For these individuals, the justice system as a whole is not a viable means
of conflict resolution.
As previously discussed, there will always be individuals who wish
to have counsel and cannot afford it, and there will likewise always be
individuals who simply choose to proceed pro se.89 The fact that some
pro se litigants choose to represent themselves does not suggest that the
cost of litigation and attorneys is not a barrier for many individuals from
participating in the judicial process. For individuals living paycheck to
paycheck, getting paid only for the hours they work, the ability to attend
hours of court hearings is as much out of their reach as the money needed
to hire an attorney. The cost of litigation and attorneys is certainly a
significant but it is not the solitary reason for pro se litigants.90 No matter
how much funding legal aid organizations have or how many pro bono
85. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
86. Esquivel, supra note 34, at 93.
87. Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable Response to
the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1879, 1883-84 (1999) (citations omitted).
88. Id.
89. Thompson, supra note 56.
90. See supra pp. 7-8.
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hours attorneys donate, there will always be some individuals who will
want to litigate pro se.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PROCEEDING PRO SE
Not having representation can negatively affect both the litigant and
others. Pro se litigants are regularly perceived in a negative manner; they
are “most often attacked for the judicial inefficiencies many judges,
attorneys, and observers believe they create. Pro se litigants are more
likely to neglect time limits, miss court deadlines, and have problems
understanding and applying the procedural and substantive law
pertaining to their claim.”91 Routinely they are described as ‘“pests,’
‘nuts,’ ‘an increasing problem,’ [and they are blamed for] ‘clogging our
judicial system.’”92 They are thought of as being underprivileged,
uneducated,93 and almost certainly “lack[ing] . . . both the skill and
knowledge adequately needed to prepare their defense.”94 They are
believed to be unduly burdensome on judges, clerks, and court
processes;95 many pro se litigants require additional time at the clerk’s
office and in the courtroom because they do not understand the
procedures or the limitations of the court.96 Pro se litigants may clutter up
cases with rambling, illogical pleadings, motions, and briefs.97 Lawyers
and judges even express concerns that pro se litigants are using their
status to gain an unfair advantage over represented parties, who are
required to “play by the rules.”98
One example of how pro se litigants have had a negative effect on
the judicial system can be found in New York’s Housing Court. The
problems of pro se litigants in the court have become so vast that there
are now periodic calls for the elimination of that court entirely.99

91. Buxton, supra note 4, at 114 (citations omitted); Barry, supra note 24, at 1894.
92. Rosenbloom, supra note 3, at 381.
93. McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 1118.
94. Holt, supra note 2, at 167.
95. Engler, supra note 4, at 2050-51; Greacen, supra note 28.
96. Hough, supra note 24.
97. Nichols, supra note 12, at 351.
98. Engler, supra note 4, at 1988.
99. Engler, supra note 4, at 2065 (citing criticisms of the New York Housing Court including
overcrowding, unsympathetic and hostile court staff and judges, and attorneys intentionally
misleading and bullying pro se litigants); see also Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The
Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV.
79 (1997).
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VI. CONCLUSION
As with most issues, there are two competing visions of the current
pro se environment. On one hand, the pro se litigant is viewed as the
poor person who cannot afford counsel and is therefore unable to
participate in the hyper-technical procedural maze of the modern judicial
system. On the other hand, the pro se litigant is perceived as a nut who
files rambling, illogical lawsuits to settle personal vendettas and advance
his or her own social and political agenda.100 This negative perception of
pro se litigants, however, has not been objectively studied or
documented. Nor is there extensive research to support the perceived
negative effect pro se litigants supposedly have on our courts.101 While
“[t]he image of the inexperience of a pro se litigant creating dilemmas
and frustrations during a trial or hearing has a basis in reality,” the data
from studies that are available suggests that this picture is not the
norm.102 One study compared pro se and represented-party cases finding
that represented-party cases were the most time consuming and had the
most docket entries.103 Additionally, pro se cases were being settled at
virtually the same rate as those with represented parties, again belying
the notion that pro se cases always go to trial and do not settle.104
Pro se litigants, in many courts, have become the norm. While
undoubtedly there needs to be greater efforts to provide legal
assistance—whether through legal aid organizations or pro bono work by
the bar—there are individuals who for a variety of reasons will choose to
proceed pro se. This pro se phenomenon creates several competing issues
for courts and the justice system. There is a need to provide individuals
who cannot afford or do not desire representation with meaningful access
to the courts, while at the same time protecting the ability of the courts to
provide impartial and timely justice.105 If having pro se litigants creates
problems for our courts, the solution is not to eliminate the parties’
ability to represent themselves, but rather to put forth concerted efforts to
study and address the underlying issues and mechanisms relating to how
pro se litigants interact with the court.
Currently, some commentators are calling for greater
accommodation for pro se litigants in comparison to represented
parties.106 For instance, some have argued that procedural and
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Nichols, supra note 12.
Rosenbloom, supra note 3, at 312-14.
Greacen, supra note 28, at 11 (citations omitted).
Rosenbloom, supra note 3, at 358-59.
Buxton, supra note 4, at 145-46.
Harrison, supra note 27, at 70.
See, e.g., Engler, supra note 4, at 1987; Buxton, supra note 4, at 103; Lee, supra note 15,
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evidentiary rules should not apply to pro se litigants.107 Others have
argued that judges and clerks owe a duty to actively assist pro se litigants
both inside and outside the courtroom, providing legal advice and
information as needed by the litigant.108 Many of these suggestions are
premised on the belief that pro se litigants are involuntarily representing
themselves, something that the available data contradicts in part.109
Policy makers, in determining whether to modify rules of procedure and
evidence or the roles of judges and court staff, need to have a firm
understanding of why individuals are proceeding pro se so as to best
justify any changes to the traditional adversarial system used throughout
our courts. The justification to make changes is much weaker when pro
se litigants choose to represent themselves—as in effect they would be
“choosing” to opt out of the rules and procedures that apply to every
other litigant—as opposed to being forced by economic necessity to
proceed pro se. If changes are going to be made to our legal system to
better accommodate pro se litigants, we need to be sure that they are
being made for the right reasons.

at 1261; McLaughlin, supra note 16. But see Access to Justice: Does it Exist in Civil Cases?, supra
note 62 (stating that the suggestion that the rules of procedure and evidence should not apply at all to
pro se litigants is nothing new).
107. Lee, supra note 15, at 1270-71; McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 1122; Bradlow, supra note
14, at 683; Buxton, supra note 4, at 106.
108. Holt, supra note 2, at 167; Engler, supra note 4, at 2037-38; Margaret Martin Barry,
Access to Justice Conference September 11, 2001: Access to Justice: On Dialogues with the
Judiciary, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1102 (2002); Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s
Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, supra note 4, at
48-49; see generally Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial
Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes,
Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2004).
109. Compare Bradlow, supra note 14, at 659, Engler, supra note 4, at 1987, and McLaughlin,
supra note 16, with supra pp. 7-8.

